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Euclidean public sector preferences can not be induced from a strictly
quasiconcave primitive utility function and a linear constraint.Milyo 2
Introduction
In spatial models of collective choice, individual preferences are often
represented as induced preferences in policy space (or “public sector preferences”). 
These induced preferences are typically understood to be derived from an
underlying constrained maximization involving a primitive utility function of the
conventional sort (e.g., Denzau and Parks 1977, 1979, Diba and Feldman 1984,
and Slutsky 1975, 1977).  Given the usual assumptions of individual utility
maximization, it is well-known that the induced preferences over policy exhibit a
unique satiation point (corresponding to the constrained maximum of the
underlying primitive utility function) and have strictly convex level sets.
In many applications, public sector preferences also are assumed to be
Euclidean;  that is, the public sector preferences are not just separable, but utility
declines monotonically in distance from the ideal point.  This assumption drives
many important results in collective choice (e.g., McKelvey 1976, Laver and
Shepsle 1996,  Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1984 and Koford 1989;  also, see Milyo
1999).  Below, I demonstrate below that well-behaved public sector preferences
are never Euclidean.
Public sector preferencesMilyo 3
The canonical derivation of public sector preferences involves a collective
of individuals in an economy consisting of two publicly provided goods (z , z ) and 1 2
one composite private good (x).  For simplicity, let the publicly provided goods be
pure public goods; therefore, any individual citizen in the collective has three
arguments in his utility function: (x, z , z ).  From the perspective of this citizen, 1 2
the private good is a free choice variable and the publicly provided goods (i.e.,
“policies”) are strictly rationed at a level chosen by the collective.
Assume a linear budget constraint and normalize prices relative to the price
of x.  The individual’s utility maximization problem is then:
Maximize U(x, z , z ) subject to B = p z  + p z  + x. (1) 1 2 1 1 2 2
Let U be strictly quasiconcave and continuously differentiable, so that there exits a
unique constrained maximum to this problem and well-behaved demand functions. 
The solution to (1) is trivial when both publicly provided goods are rationed:
 x* = B - p z  - p z . (2) 1 1 2 2
Finally, define the individual’s “ideal point” to be the constrained maximumMilyo 4
of (1) when no goods are rationed.  Denote this as (x*, z *, z *). 1 2
In spatial models of politics, it is the convention to work with the
individual’s induced preferences over policy (or “public sector preferences”). 
These may be represented by substituting (2) into the utility function.  Denote the
resulting mixed indirect utility function by V(z , z ).  The individual’s preferences 1 2
over policy are then described by the level sets of V(z , z ) and the ideal point is 1 2
simply the maximum of this function.
Separable and Euclidean public sector preferences
       It is common in spatial models of politics to assume that V(z , z ) is  1 2
separable;  that is, the individual’s most preferred level of z  is independent of any 1
fixed level of z , and vice versa.  Clearly, this property can not hold for all feasible 2
policies (e.g., when p z  + p z = B), so throughout this analysis I restrict attention 1 1 2 2 
to regular and interior solutions to (1).
There are several caveats and criticisms in the economics literature
concerning the properties of public sector preferences (for a review, see Milyo
1999).  For example, Slutsky (1975) shows that V(z , z ) is separable when the 1 2
demands for the publicly provided goods are independent of income.  Diba and
Feldman (1984) demonstrate for the canonical three good case presented here, thatMilyo 5
a quasilinear utility function can generate separable public sector preferences.
Milyo (1999) extends Diba and Feldman’s result to show that given a
strictly quasiconcave primitive utility function and a linear constraint, separability
can be a general property of the public sector preferences only for the case of one
private good.  Consequently, the example presented in this exercise is fairly
general.  This is because any number of publicly provided goods may be imagined
to be fixed at their ideal level in this example.
Euclidean preferences are a subset of separable preferences for which
utility declines monotonically in distance from the ideal point.  This implies that the
level sets of V(z , z ) are concentric circles about the ideal point. 1  2
Public sector preferences are not Euclidean
Suppose an individual’s public sector preferences are Euclidean with an
ideal point located at (z *, z *).  Consider a particular level set, V(z , z  )=c, which 1 2 1 2
is away from the ideal point.  This implies that:
V(z * + dcosè , z * + dsinè ) = c, (3) 1 2
 for all d > 0 and 0 < è < 2ð Milyo 6
Making use of (2) and the definition of public sector preferences, (3) may be re-
written as:
U(B - p z * - p dcosè - p z * - p dsinè , z * + dcosè , z * + dsinè ) = c (4) 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
 for all d > 0 and 0 < è < 2ð 
Differentiate (4) with respect to è and re-arrange terms to show that:
dcosè*(p U  - U ) + dsinè*(p U  - U ) = 0. (5) 2 x z2 1 x z1
It will now be shown that this condition can be satisfied for only four points in any
given level set (other than the ideal point).
First, consider the case when only z  is fixed at some arbitrary z , while x 2 2
0
and z  are left as choice variables.  In this case, and for a well-behaved primitive 1
utility function, the first order conditions for the constrained maximum of
U(x,z ,z ) imply that (p U  - U ) = 0 (a.k.a., the “equimarginal” condition).  Note 1 2 1 x z1
0
also that the definition of Euclidean preferences implies that constrained optimal
value of z  is z *.  Consequently, dcosè = 0 and condition (5) is satisfied at the 1 1
constrained maximum, (B-p z *-p ,z , z *,z ).  There will be two points on any 1 1 2 2 1 2
0 0Milyo 7
level set of V(z , z  ) which are constrained optima when z  is a free choice variable 1 2 1
(when z  = z * + dsinè); at these two points, condition (5) is satisfied.  Similarly, 2 2
0
when z  is fixed at an arbitrary level, condition (5) will be satisfied at two 1
analogous points on the given level set (these four points correspond to the four
“compass points” on any level set).
Now consider the case when both z  and z  are fixed at arbitrary points 1 2
(z ,z ) not equal to z * or  z *.  It follows that neither dcosè nor dsinè is equal to 1 2 1 2
0 0
zero.  It is also the case that each of the publicly provided goods is either being
under-consumed or over-consumed relative to consumption when either or both of
the z’s are free variables.  Consequently, for a well-behaved primitive utility
fuinction, the equimarginal condition does not hold and condition (5) is not
satisfied at (B-p z -p z ,z ,z ).  This demonstrates that not only are well behaved 1 1 2 2 1 2
0 0 0 0
public sector preferences never Euclidean, but that (for d>0) no level set of
V(z ,z ) can be a circle centered on the ideal point. 1 2Milyo 8
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